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The Stability and Growth Pact, originally designed to protect the integrity of monetary 
union based on price stability and fiscal discipline, has created a rift between states and 
institutions.  Larger states like Germany and France have repeatedly violated the terms of 
the pact, while smaller states like the Netherlands and Austria have steadfastly defended 
it.  This paper explores how size has affected the economic interests of the Eurozone 
countries and how these interests will translate into policy changes, taking into account 
the possibility of coalitions forming between states as well as across institutions, with the 
European Central Bank taking the position of the smaller states in defending the original 
pact.  
 
 
 
  0The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has proven to be far more contentious than 
one might have expected, given its origins.  Devised in 1995 by German Finance Minister 
Theo Waigel in order to ensure the continued observance of strict fiscal policies after 
monetary union commenced, the country that originated the SGP became one of its first 
transgressors.  Indeed, several countries have earned the Commission’s ire as a result of 
their inability to remain under the deficit ceilings mandated by the Pact.  Concern over 
the inability of these countries to fulfill their SGP requirements has been matched by 
concern over the differential treatment of these economies by their peers in the Ecofin 
Council; while larger states like Germany and France are able to repeatedly violate the 
Pact, seemingly with impunity, smaller countries like Portugal and Greece seem to be 
held to a higher standard and are expected to bring their economies back in line more 
quickly.  In addition, the attitudes of the Finance Ministers in regard to the strictness of 
the interpretation of the Pact has also varied according to size; while larger countries like 
Italy (and France and Germany, not surprisingly) have advocated reform, smaller 
countries like Austria and the Netherlands have warned of the loss of credibility that 
would ensue a loosening of the Pact. 
This paper considers the role that country size plays in the operation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, arguing that it impacts the SGP in three interrelated ways: the 
country’s economic interest, its policy options, and the reaction of other countries to 
those options.  The following section briefly explains the technical operation of the Pact 
and how it relies primarily on reputation concerns to keep participating countries in line.  
The widely discussed consensus regarding the importance of tight monetary policy and 
by extension fiscal balance should make this process relatively straightforward: if the 
  1countries agree on the importance of these economic objectives, non-adherence to them 
should be a cause for concern among all the parties.  In practice, however, this has not 
been the case, and countries have demonstrated different levels of tolerance for the Pact’s 
stringent requirements.  Numerous reforms have been suggested, but agreement has been 
difficult to achieve.  Battle lines have been drawn largely along country size. 
Country size affects a state’s economic interests, its policy options, and the 
reactions of fellow Member States and EU institutions.  Economic research demonstrates 
that smaller countries have less of an ability to run counter-cyclical cycles than larger 
countries, making the SGP more costly for the latter as it closes off policy options that 
are not available to its smaller counterparts.  In addition, the larger size of these countries 
gives them more voting weight within the Council of Ministers, and therefore it is costly 
in the long run for smaller countries to alienate these larger states by voting against them.  
The built-in influence that these countries enjoy by virtue of their larger size makes 
punishment by “naming and shaming” also irrelevant.  Moreover, the larger countries 
have been leading the way in monetary integration for years, helping to create the 
stability culture (Germany) and the potential for the politicization of policy (France), 
making the SGP controversy a continuation of a battle of ideas that now have the two 
countries on the same side. 
The final section examines the short history of the Stability and Growth Pact and 
how it has treated its transgressors.  Larger countries like France and Germany were able 
to escape formal and to a large extent informal censure in a way that smaller countries 
like Portugal and Greece were not.  Until the economic circumstances become more 
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to accommodate their interests and deal with all of the states more flexibly. 
 
The Logic of the Stability and Growth Pact: Questioning the Strength of the Consensus 
The Maastricht Treaty outlined plans for monetary union by requiring would-be 
participants to achieve the convergence criteria in order to ensure that the Eurozone 
would be comprised of economies that would not threaten Germany’s price stability.  By 
the late 1980s, monetary politics in the EC followed the lead of West Germany, whose 
currency formed the unofficial anchor of the system.  Ideas regarding the long-term trade-
off between inflation and unemployment were replaced by a consensus on the need for 
low inflation in order to be able to keep interest rates low, thus spurring economic growth 
(McNamara 1998).  The Maastricht Treaty thus demanded convergence in inflation, 
exchange rates, interest rates, debts and deficits for the participants, though countries 
could be approaching the required levels and still be admitted to EMU, so long as the 
other Member States agreed (as was the case for Italy and Belgium).  The pursuit of 
economic growth through an independent central bank and fiscal policies that would limit 
the ability of governments to intervene in the economy reflect the neoliberal consensus 
that prevailed in the 1990s (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2004).    
However, there were no mechanisms to ensure that the fiscal rectitude would 
continue once monetary union began, prompting German Finance Minister Theo Waigel 
to construct the Stability Pact.  The Pact would also have the additional benefits of 
buttressing the credibility of the nascent monetary union as well as provide participants 
with a framework for policy coordination post-EMU (Heipertz and Verdun 2004).   The 
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French government; French Finance Minister Dominque Strauss Kahn argued that they 
were  “entering into a new phase of European politics…[and a] policy mix that supports 
growth,”
1 emphasizing the importance of policy objectives besides price stability to 
Germany’s partners (Chang 2002).  Though the importance of controlling inflation has 
been emphasized repeatedly throughout the monetary union process, the issue of how 
EMU does (and does not) promote growth was sidelined in favor of constructing a 
credible institution (the European Central Bank) and system (comprised of the ECB, the 
Eurogroup, and Ecofin councils) that would not jeopardize the pursuit of price stability.  
Therefore the Eurogroup had to settle for informal status, to the chagrin of those who had 
tried to make it an economic government to counterweight the independent ECB, and 
additional legislation was passed to ensure continued vigilance against fighting inflation.  
The concern for growth later would be resurrected by France as well as its former 
opponent-turned-ally in the SGP reform debate, Germany, shortly after the introduction 
of the euro.     
As described on the Europa website,
2 the SGP entails three elements: 1.) a 
political commitment to a budget surveillance process, with the desired effect being that 
“effective peer pressure is exerted on a Member State failing to live up to its 
commitments”; 2.)  preventive elements to stop countries from exceeding the 3 percent 
reference value, with Member States submitting stability and convergence programs to 
the Council.  The Council (acting by a qualified majority), on the recommendation of the 
Commission, can issue an early warning to Member States before an excessive deficit 
                                                 
1 Reuters, November 16, 1998 
2 http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/sgp_en.htm),   
  4occurs, with the expectation being that the transgressing state will take steps to rectify its 
budgetary situation; 3.) dissuasive elements in the form of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, which demands immediate action on the part of the Member State and can 
entail the imposition of monetary fines.  Such sanctions begin as a non-interest-bearing 
deposit with the Commission that equals 0.2 percent of GDP plus a figure linked to the 
size of the deficit.  The Council may intensify these sanctions each subsequent year with 
the imposition of additional fines that may not exceed 0.5 percent of GDP on an annual 
basis.  The deposit becomes a fine if the excessive deficit remains after two years.   
Exceptions can be made if an unusual event beyond the Member State’s control impacts 
its financial situation or if the country experiences a severe economic downturn that 
causes its real GDP to drop by at least 2 percent. 
Adopted in 1997, the aforementioned disagreement over the name of the Pact 
proved prescient in the subsequent arguments regarding the Pact’s overall utility for the 
EMU project as well as criticism in regard to how the SGP has been implemented.  While 
a widespread consensus existed for the emphasis placed on price stability in monetary 
union, the role of the coordination of fiscal policy in the form of the SGP has come under 
debate since its inception.  The role of various EU institutions (national governments 
versus European institutions such as the Commission) and the way in which the Pact 
should be interpreted have been the focus of most of these debates.  Disagreement 
between Member States and also other EU institutions prompted the European 
Commission to involve the European Court of Justice when it sued Ecofin in 2004 for 
suspending the Pact’s rules; after winning its court case, the Commission proceeded to 
issue proposals for its reform.  The topic has also preoccupied both the Ecofin Council 
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both to consider reform.   
The Commission adopted a communication on September 3, 2004, in which it 
advocated that the sustainability of public finances play a stronger role in the SGP and 
that the different economic situations of the Member States in the EU-25 must be 
accounted for.  In order to strengthen the credibility and enforcement of the SGP, the 
Commission’s proposals focused on a more serious consideration of the debt criterion (as 
opposed to the deficit), looking at the medium and long-term sustainability of a nation’s 
debt, incorporating a myriad of factors that could influence the development of the debt. 
In addition, the proposal advocates the weighting of “more country-specific 
circumstances” when determining whether or not a country is “close to balance or in 
surplus.”  Finally, economic circumstances and developments must be taken into account 
when deciding to implement the Excessive Deficit Procedure, as “exceptionally weak 
economic growth” should be factored into any identification of an excessive deficit as 
well as in the policy recommendations made to rectify the deficit.  The onus of economic 
adjustment remains with the Member States, however, as they are expected to “correct 
inadequate budgetary developments” and to strive for budget surpluses during economic 
good times in order to weather economic downturns.
3  Commission President Barrosso 
emphasized that the SGP needed to be “adjusted, but not killed” (La Stampa, 1/13/2005). 
In January 2005, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder offered his thoughts on 
the reform of the SGP,
4 arguing for a loosening of the Pact’s rules and for a curtailment 
                                                 
3 http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/sgp/com2004581_en.htm  
4 On July 14, 2003, French President Jacques Chirac called for a “softening” of the Pact, but did not have 
specific reform proposals. This announcement was rejected by the Commission and criticized by EU 
Finance Ministers. (Financial Times, 7/14/2003) 
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Deutschland, 1/17/2005).  For example, he argued that the quality of the debt undertaken 
should be considered; if structural reforms in taxes, labor markets, education, or research 
and development caused a government to exceed its fiscal deficit limits, this should not 
be punished automatically.   Under Schroeder’s proposal, it would be much more difficult 
for the Commission to initiate Excessive Deficit Procedures (Financial Times 1/16/2005).  
German Finance Minister Hans Eichel emphasized that the goal was not to weaken the 
Pact but to have a more reasonable implementation of its criteria (FT Deutschland, 
1/18/2005).  Many criticized Schroeder’s involvement; Luxembourg Prime Minister and 
Finance Minister Jean-Claude Juncker noted, “ "He is not in charge of the European 
economy, he is not a head of state either, he's just a head of government," (Financial 
Times, 1/19/2005).  Belgian Finance Minister Didier Reynders questioned the overall 
utility of the proposals, arguing that Schroeder’s motives are the result of Germany’s 
inability to achieve the SGP’s guidelines rather than something that would benefit EMU 
overall, while Austrian Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser warned of the danger of 
political leaders becoming involved in matters for Finance Ministers (Le Figaro, 
1/18/2005).  Dutch Finance Minister (and one of the authors of the SGP) Gerrit Zalm 
echoed this sentiment (FT Deutschland 1/18/2005), and he called such political 
intervention to loosen the SGP a “horror scenario” (Financial Times, 1/16/2005).   
Europe’s Finance Ministers have also been hard at work at reforming the SGP.  
Under the Luxembourg Presidency, Juncker presented a 14-page text to Ecofin in early 
March 2005.  This proposal attempted to reach a compromise among the factions that 
divide largely along size, with France, Germany, and Italy leading the way for a 
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smaller states, led by Austria and the Netherlands, arguing for adherence to the original 
Pact.  The text alters the original SGP by taking into account the “quality of 
expenditures”, the cost of structural reforms (in which the costs of German unification 
would be a factor), and external shocks.  Contrary to Germany’s wishes, however, the 
proposal allows the Commission to retain its power in SGP procedures; Schroeder had 
hoped for a political judgment instead (Le Monde, 3/8/2005).    
Unable to reach an agreement at this session, another meeting was scheduled for 
March 20, just before the EU summit of heads of state and government set for March 22-
23.  The Eurozone members seemed more amenable to make compromises quickly, but 
the new member states from central and eastern Europe were loathe to allow reforms that 
could jeopardize monetary union in advance of their membership, which they hope to 
achieve in short order.  According to Juncker, "Many of the new member states want to 
avoid absolutely every change to the pact that could weaken the credibility and stability 
of the single currency" (Financial Times 3/8/2005).   
Finally, a compromise was reached in which the “unification of Europe” was 
deemed an acceptable justification for its breach of the SGP, and Germany was allowed 
to offset reunification costs at 4 percent of GDP a year.  In exchange, Schroeder agreed to 
abandon his efforts to reduce the role of the Commission in policing the Pact.  Italian 
Finance Minister Domenico Siniscalco remarked that the revisions seek both stability and 
growth (La Repubblica, 3/21/05), as the name of the SGP implies.  Indeed, pension 
reforms will be considered when evaluating large budget deficits in excess of SGP limits, 
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European goals.”   
Which factors would be relevant varies according to each Member State, which 
determines for itself what factors should be considered by the Commission and Ecofin.  
This was done to resolve another bone of contention in which larger states wanted a 
longer list of relevant factors in the proposal, while the smaller states thought there were 
too many; in the end, the list itself was abandoned (euobserver.com, 3/21/2005).   
In the event that a country is found to have an excessive deficit, the deadline to 
correct it has been extended from one year to two, and that this grace period could be 
extended further in the event of "unexpected adverse economic events with major 
unfavourable budgetary effects occur during the excessive deficit procedure," so 
countries could have as long as five years to correct their deficit.  Juncker noted that once 
again, while the Eurozone members agreed to the reforms relatively early on in the 
discussions, it took considerably longer to bring the EU-25 on board (Financial Times 
3/20/2005), indicating that the small states versus larger stated battle has not yet abated 
despite the successful conclusion to this Ecofin meeting. 
In addition to the talks by policymakers on the need to reform the SGP, 
economists were also quick to point out its weaknesses, and some of these criticisms 
factored into the aforementioned policy decisions.  Early reports expressed concern that 
the SGP would divert efforts towards more necessary economic reforms in the European 
labor market, for example (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998).  More recent analyses 
suggest that while the EDP places too much emphasis on the government’s budget 
deficit, a greater emphasis on the sustainability of the government’s public debt levels 
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(Mortensen 2004), a factor that was introduced in all of the reform proposals discussed 
above.  In addition, tight monetary and fiscal policy may be strategic substitutes for one 
another, with looser fiscal policy promoting tighter monetary policy and vice versa 
(Mélitz 1997), possibly making the SGP less critical to EMU’s success given the 
ideational convergence on tight monetary policy and lack of a similarly strong consensus 
on tight fiscal policy.   
One of the most common criticisms brought about in policy circles is that the SGP 
is counterproductive in achieving one its nominally central tenets, that of economic 
growth.  Economists have argued, tight monetary policy may also be counterproductive 
within the context of EMU because it punishes offending countries when they are likely 
to be facing an economic recession, thus exacerbating their problem (Buiter, Corsetti, and 
Roubini 1993).   Many of the problems facing the countries of the EU are the result of 
weak economic growth and in some cases, negative growth.  
 
Table 1  GDP growth rate, deficit/surplus in EU by country, 2001-2004 
Country                     GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP 
2001  2002 2003 2004 
Belgium                     GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP 
0.7 
+0.6 
0.9 
+0.1 
1.3 
+0.4 
2.5 
+0.1 
 
Czech Republic        GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP 
2.6 
-5.9 
1.5 
-6.8 
3.7 
-11.7 
4.0 
-3.0 
Denmark                   GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
1.6 
+3.2 
1.0 
+1.7 
0.4 
+1.2 
2.0 
+2.8 
Germany                   GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP 
0.8 
-2.8 
0.1 
-3.7 
-0.1 
-3.8 
1.6 
-3.7 
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Estonia                       GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP 
6.4 
+0.3 
7.2 
+1.4 
5.1 
+3.1 
5.9 f 
+1.8 
Greece                        GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP 
4.3 
-3.6 
3.8 
-4.1 
4.7 
-5.2 
4.2 
-6.1 
Spain                           GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP 
2.8 
-0.5 
2.2 
-0.3 
2.5 
+0.3 
2.6 f 
-0.3 
France                        GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP 
2.1 
-1.5 
1.2 
-3.2 
0.5 
-4.2 
2.4 f 
-3.7 
Ireland                      GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
6.0 
+0.9 
6.1 
-0.4 
3.7 
+0.2 
5.2 f 
+1.3 
Italy                          GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
1.8 
-3.0 
0.4 
-2.6 
0.3 
-2.9 
1.2 
-3.0 
Cyprus                      GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
4.1 
-2.3 
2.1 
-4.5 
2.0 
-6.3 
3.7 
-4.2 
Latvia                       GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
8.0 
-2.1 
6.4 
-2.7 
7.5 
-1.5 
8.5 
-0.8 
Lithuania                   GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
6.4 
-2.0 
6.8 
-1.5 
9.7 
-1.9 
6.7 
-2.5 
Luxembourg              GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
1.5 
+6.2 
2.5 
+2.3 
2.9 
+0.5 
4.0 f 
-1.1 
Hungary                    GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
3.8 
-3.7 
3.0 
-8.5 
3.5 
-6.2 
4.0 
-4.5 
Malta                          GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
-1.7 
-6.4 
2.2 
-5.9 
-1.8 
-10.5 
1.5 
-5.2 
Netherlands                GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
1.4 
-0.1 
0.6 
-1.9 
-0.9 
-3.2 
1.4 f 
-2.5 
Austria                        GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
0.7 
+0.3 
1.2 
-0.2 
0.8 
-1.1 
2.0 
-1.3 
Poland                         GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
1.0 
-3.9 
1.4 
-3.6 
3.8 
-4.5 
5.3 
-4.8 
Portugal                     GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
1.7 
-4.4 
0.4 
-2.7 
-1.1 
-2.9 
1.0 
-2.9 
Slovenia                      GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
2.7 
-2.8 
3.3 
-2.4 
2.5 
-2.0 
4.6 
-1.9 
Slovakia                     GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
3.8 
-6.0 
4.6 
-5.7 
4.5 
-3.7 
5.5 
-3.3 
Finland                     GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
1.1 
+5.2 
2.2 
+4.3 
2.4 
+2.5 
3.7 
+2.1 
Sweden                       GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
1.0 
+2.5 
2.0 
-0.3 
1.5 
+0.2 
3.5 
+1.4 
United Kingdom        GDP growth rate (%) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) as percentage of GDP   
2.3 
+0.7 
1.8 
-1.7 
2.2 
-3.4 
3.0 
-3.2 
Source: Eurostat (2005)   f=forecast 
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has not been reached in regard to how the Eurozone does and should operate, making the 
imposition of a policy as rigid as the original SGP problematic (Allsopp and Artis 2003).  
Economic research indicates that country size can have a strong effect on a country’s 
economic interests, making such disputes a predictable outcome of this one-size-fits-all 
policy.  In addition to these economic realities, political realities also deem that larger 
countries play a different role in the management of the SGP than smaller ones. 
 
Country Size and Economic Interests 
In a recent symposium in the Journal of Common Market Studies, authors 
summarized the different schools of thought in relation to how country size affects its 
economic interest (Buti and Pench 2004).  First, larger countries find fiscal consolidation 
to be more costly due to the larger impact that an increase in government expenditure has 
in big countries versus small countries (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2004; Laurent and Le 
Cacheux 2004).  Second, larger countries in the EU have been growing more slowly than 
their smaller counterparts, making fiscal consolidation more difficult.  Third, unlike small 
countries, large countries need not fear the political fallout that may ensue a violation of 
the SGP.  While a small country may pay a penalty in terms of a loss of reputation or 
influence within the EU should it breach the Pact, concerns over their reputation with 
other Member States or institutions weighs less heavily than domestic political 
imperatives (von Hagen 2002).  Larger countries would also be less likely to suffer from 
any sanctions from fellow Member States, particularly if several countries violate the 
pact.  Larger countries innately possess influence, and if more than one country 
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Berger, and Jansen 2004).   
Not only are larger countries less likely to suffer if they breach the Pact, they are 
more likely to benefit than smaller countries would.  Pre-EMU, larger states either set 
monetary policy (Germany) or could adjust their exchange rates periodically (France and 
Italy); smaller states were more likely to have followed a policy of a hard peg to the DM, 
making the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria and the SGP less 
costly for them (Posen 2004).   In effect, the smaller states enjoyed less autonomy due to 
their size, so the restrictions of the SGP are less constraining than for large states, which 
would try to offset their loss of monetary autonomy with more flexible fiscal policy.  
Politics and ideas surrounding the importance of European unification guided Germany 
towards surrendering its currency, rather than strong expectations of economic benefits 
(Baun 1996; Dyson and Featherstone 1999).  For the small states, the choice for monetary 
union was more obvious, as they would benefit from the lower interest rates and greater 
credibility that monetary union could provide without paying the cost in the loss of 
monetary sovereignty, something they had already abandoned during their years in the 
European Monetary System.  Therefore, damaging that credibility by engaging in fiscal 
behavior that could weaken the SGP held greater costs for smaller states.   
Much concern had been expressed regarding the wisdom of imposing a single 
interest rate on an region that had not yet achieved the criteria advised by optimum 
currency level theorists (Dibooglu and Horvath 1997; Eichengreen 1992; Mundell 1961).   
Though the Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria were clear in regard to establishing 
clear thresholds and goals that countries needed to achieve in order to make EMU a 
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Member States as possible to join EMU (albeit to the annoyance of some states, such as 
the Netherlands, which would have preferred a stricter interpretation of the convergence 
criteria).  Though the EMU states may be moving towards an optimum currency area as a 
result of monetary integration and the expected increase in trade (Frankel and Rose 
1998), the component Member States still do not have the same economic experience that 
makes one policy optimal for all states.  Potentially fiscal policy could alleviate some of 
the tensions that this situation gives rise to, but the potential for moral hazard and the 
inflationary consequences of the bailout of profligate governments made the SGP an 
important component of buttressing the credibility of EMU.   
However, some have argued that the SGP does not constrain fiscal policy as much 
as economist, policymakers and the media have argued.  Empirical tests demonstrate that 
discretionary budget deficits have become even more countercyclical since EMU began a 
trend present in non-EMU countries as well (Gali and Perotti 2003). 
The controversy over the SGP can be viewed in some ways as a continuation of 
the debate on the wisdom of monetary integration among still disparate economies with 
different economic incentives.  The basis of many of these differences depends on 
country size. 
 
Country Size and Policy Options 
As the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War explained, the strong 
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.  This explanation of international 
relations has informed many analyses, especially those subscribing to realist principles.  
  14International organizations like the European Union attempted to rise above the nation-
state in order to foster more peace and cooperation through interstate treaties as well as 
the development of supranational forms of governance that would upgrade the common 
interest and provide Member States with long-term benefits despite having to pay costs in 
the short-run.  A long-running debate among EU scholars focuses on the relative 
importance of nation states versus supranational institutions and transnational actors 
(some prominent examples include (Haas 1957; Hoffmann 1966; Lindberg and 
Scheingold 1970; Moravcsik 1998; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989).  More recently, some 
theorists have tried to bridge this gap between intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism with frameworks of analysis that incorporate both sets of actors and 
ascribe them with important powers and functions which vary by issue area and level of 
governance (Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Pollack 1997).   
In reference to European monetary union in particular, nation states, especially 
Germany (Chang 2002; Heisenberg 1998; Kaltenthaler 2002; Loedel 1999; Moravcsik 
1998), and ideas (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; McNamara 1998; Verdun 1999) have 
been the primary explanatory variables for the timing, pace and content of monetary 
integration.  Though economic, ideational and organizational factors play a role, all of the 
aforementioned theories to varying degrees have given Germany pride of place in 
explaining why EMU occurred and why it looks the way that it does.  Historically the 
long-term success of monetary union has depended on either the presence of a dominant 
state that can maintain order within the region, or a broad network of institutional 
linkages across nation states that make reduced national autonomy acceptable to 
participants (Cohen 1994).  EMU has made use of both mechanisms, but German 
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monetary union.  As the holder of the unofficial leading currency of the EMS, Germany 
had the most to lose by changing the status quo and giving up its stable and credible 
currency for one forged with its European partners.  Germany agreed to monetary union 
due to their desire to integrate Germany further with Europe prior to unification in order 
to assuage remaining doubts and fears about its geopolitical aspirations (Kaltenthaler 
2002).  Given its importance to EMU due to its size and its leading role in the existing 
arrangement for monetary cooperation, Germany could frame much of the debate and 
institutionalize its preferences in the form of the ECB’s independence, the Maastricht 
convergence criteria and the SGP, in addition to preventing an economic government 
from forming as a counterweight to the ECB.   
But economic conditions have changed since the 1990s, and so have Germany’s 
interests.  Unemployment has been a vexing problem since unification, and its economy 
still has not recovered from the costs of this massive project.  Moreover, the urgency felt 
by earlier statesmen for solidifying European cooperation no longer exists.  Europe lacks 
any grand projects to propel integration forward, bringing the risk of stagnation, 
particularly as new members with divergent interests continue to join the EU.  The costs 
to Germany for not cooperating with the rules of EMU are relatively low.  Without 
German leadership, will monetary cooperation stagnate and become less credible? 
Though Germany played a leading role, it was not the only important actor in 
monetary integration.  For example, France made significant contributions to monetary 
integration (Chang 2002; Howarth 2000).  France’s longstanding attempts to make 
monetary cooperation in Europe more symmetrical finally gained German consent in the 
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demanded adherence to strict economic criteria, France made the adjustment to EMU 
easier and more feasible for a larger group of states by making membership a decision 
made by politicians rather than central bankers or even finance ministers.  Similarly, SGP 
rules do not automatically impose fines; they must first be approved by Ecofin, and in the 
wake of the recent reforms to the SGP, there even more room exists for political 
discretion.   
Though France has not been ascribed the hegemonic status of Germany, it is one 
of the leading countries in the EU and in EMU.  This was evidenced by the 
unprecedented support that Germany offered France during its currency crisis in 1992, 
prior to its referendum on the Maastricht Treaty.  Though the British government 
complained bitterly about how Germany and in particular the Bundesbank handled the 
crisis (Connolly 1995; Major 1999), French participation in monetary union was 
nonnegotiable in a way that the participation of other countries (even a large and 
powerful state like Britain) was not.  
France and Germany have been the leading engines of European integration, 
including monetary integration.  Major projects have required their cooperation and 
active involvement for success.  This power means that they have policy options that are 
open to them in a way that they are not open to other EU Members, as if they do not lead 
the way or actively consent to major projects, its chances of success are limited.  Not only 
have they initiated many ideas related to European integration, they have also been able 
to amass coalitions with other nation states in order to achieve their objectives.  In the 
case of the monetary union project, for example, Germany led smaller states like the 
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paramount.  France, on the other hand, joined together with Italy for a monetary union 
that would take into account political constraints and would be less rigid than what its 
German counterpart would have preferred.  The need to have both members on board 
allowed for compromises between these different interests. 
The current difficulties with the SGP that France and Germany face indicate a 
congruence of interests.  What are their policy options, and how do they differ from those 
of smaller states?  First, it is difficult to imagine a coalition among other Member States 
that would be able to counteract effectively an alliance between the largest and politically 
most influential states in the EU.   First of all, they have ideational influence.  Many of 
the ideas relating to the structure of monetary union bear their imprint, and they are 
obvious sources for future ideas and leadership in this issue area.  Working together, one 
can imagine them changing the debate and emphasis of monetary integration towards 
growth in a way that enhances long-term cooperative prospects for Europe. 
For example, in the Eurogroup session preceding the Ecofin meetings of late 
Mach 2005, German Finance Minister Hans Eichel was reportedly isolated in his efforts 
to have German unification be given special consideration when accounting for its 
deficits.  According to Belgian Finance Minister Didier Reynders, it was “11 to 1” 
against Germany.  Eichel rationalized that the SGP already makes allowances for cases in 
which a recession necessitates a higher budget deficit, but allowing for structural reforms 
would have an even stronger impact and would essentially be a preventative measure 
against future budgetary problems.  In addition, the inclusion of German unification was 
reworded to European unification (an idea attributed to French Finance Minister Thierry 
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monetary integration and once more framed it as an issue of concern for Europe, rather 
than one of domestic politics (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3/21/2005; Le Monde, 
3/22/2005). 
Second, France and Germany, as two of the largest countries in the EU, have 
greater voting power in the Council of Ministers, making their cooperation important to 
agreements regarding monetary union.  This is particularly true when considering the 
addition of large states like Britain and Italy to their alliance, and clear battle lines have 
been drawn between the large states and small states.  Leading the way for the smaller 
states was the Austrian government, and though it had been zealously guarding the SGP, 
in the end it, too, gave in to the compromises demanded by the larger states, with Grasser 
conceding, “This wasn’t the best solution imaginable” (Le Monde, 3/22/2005).  The 
institutional structure of Ecofin that weights votes according to country size makes it 
difficult for smaller states to defeat the larger ones so long as a few of the smaller states 
are willing to defect.  This once again gives France and Germany policy options that are 
less readily accessible to smaller nations.  The possibility of issue linkage and desire for 
support from France and Germany in other issue areas raises the prospects for 
cooperation with these two nations rather than banding against them.   
Another policy option would be for alliances across institutions.  For example, the 
ECB could punish the Member States should SGP rules become too lax by raising 
interest rates; however, if these fiscal decisions do not affect inflation, the ECB would be 
reluctant to use this option (Howarth and Loedel 2004).  The ECB did threaten to use this 
weapon in the wake of the March 2005 SGP reform decision, having consistently 
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ECB’s Governing Council stated, “It is the opinion of the Bundesbank that the Pact, with 
the new rules, has been critically weakened,” warning that this would have consequences 
for monetary policy (Die Welt, 3/23/2005) 
The efficacy of linking up with the ECB in order to alter monetary policy is 
questionable, however.  Much of the influence of its predecessor, the Bundesbank, rest 
not with its official position but with its reputation, record of success, and the perception 
that is possessed superior ideas and information in regard to monetary policymaking that 
enabled it to form relationships with other influential actors, including the financial 
community (Bernhard 1998; Goodman 1992; Heisenberg 1998; Kaelberer 2003; 
McNamara 1998).  The ECB does not have the same track record or comparable 
influence in regard to its ideas. 
Monetary integration already has seen its share of ups and downs prior to the SGP 
controversy; in 1993 after widening the exchange rate bands to accommodate the increase 
in currency speculation, there was concern that this meant the end of EMU’s credibility.  
Some also decried admitting states that had not met all of the convergence criteria to 
EMU, fearing the loss of credibility before monetary union had even begun.  But the 
Member States forged on and shifted the debate away from this setback and looked 
forward to the future and how to make monetary union a viable reality.  France and 
Germany, the traditional leaders and proponents of monetary integration, are in the best 
position to shift the debate once more.  Though currently met with skepticism regarding 
the political motivations behind their ideas, their ideas have found advocates among at 
least some of the other Member States, and it could be the first step in altering 
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domestic political demands.  This will depend on the reaction of other Member States as 
well as financial market actors to the Franco-German initiatives to loosen the SGP. 
 
Country Size and Reactions 
The reaction of Member States to a government’s proposal is crucial because of 
the preference for operating on consensus.  While the SGP allows for punitive measures 
in the event of noncompliance, its brief history demonstrates how difficult it is to make 
use of these measures.  Indeed, particularly in light of the March 2005 reforms, the 
French government compared the SGP to “nuclear dissuasion” (Le Figaro, 3/23/2005).  
The most powerful sanction under a system of policy coordination is the public 
embarrassment of “naming and shaming” recalcitrant members (Meyer 2004).  The 
efficacy of such a procedure will also vary according to country size, as larger Member 
States will find less damage done to its reputation and its influence in the EU than a 
smaller state would, giving it more policy options. 
Prior to the Ecofin meeting, the Eurogroup finance ministers discuss important 
issues amongst themselves, in part to share information but also to forge a common 
ground prior to the more inclusive Ecofin meetings.  They have been successful at times 
at influencing Member State behavior, even among larger states.  The Eurogroup 
successfully dissuaded French Finance Minister Mer from making further defiant 
comments in regard to France’s adherence to the Pact in 2002; indeed, Mer went from 
stating that France had priorities other than the SGP to reiterating its importance (Puetter 
2004). However, the consensus forged among the Eurozone countries apparently has its 
limits as it has continually been tested since then as larger states strive to incorporate 
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is not in the interest of any of the participants to give the impression of a bully; German 
press accounts of the March 2005 Eurogroup meeting report that Eichel clearly avoided 
the impression that Germany succeeded through brute force against the Pact’s hardliners 
(Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, 3/22/2005). Instead he chose to emphasize, “There 
were no winners and losers” (FT Deutschland, 3/22/2005). 
The preference for consensus and the decision-making procedure of the SGP may 
be a problem in and of itself.  In December 1996, Otmar Issing, then Chief Economist of 
Bundesbank, criticized the SGP for allowing the “fiscal sinners” to be part of the 
negotiating process and be allowed to judge other states in need of reprimand for fiscal 
profligacy (Financial Times, 12/17/1996).  Not surprisingly, the ECB was very critical of 
the reform package agreed upon by the finance ministers in March 2005.  The ECB 
issued a statement expressing its concern that budgetary discipline could be destabilized 
by the new Pact and hinted that it might have to hike up interest rates to counteract its 
effect (Financial Times, 3/21/2005).  While German Finance Minister Hans Eichel made 
assurances that the new Pact was not “a license to create debt,” but rather allows for the 
consideration of “individual cases,” Juncker promised that it “would affect neither the 
culture nor practice of stability” (FT Deutschland, 3/21/2005).  Such avowals did little to 
assuage the concerns of the ECB, but thus far it has not followed through on threats to 
raise interest rates (Howarth and Loedel 2004). 
Other institutions like the Commission and the Court recognized the danger that 
the actions taken by the larger states posed not only for the SGP but also for their own 
authority.  This is why the Commission took the Council to Court, not only was it 
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as watchdog of the SGP.  Though there had been speculation in the press that the Court 
would have little incentive to take action against the two most powerful members of the 
EU, the Court’s ruling was largely in favor of the Commission. 
Financial markets would be the most significant arbiters of the SGP, as increased 
speculation or the selling off of euro-denominated assets would be the proximate cause of 
such interest rate hikes by the ECB.  Various financial market participants were 
interviewed in the press after the March 2005 reform package was passed, and they 
delivered quotes expressing disappointment with the results.  Overall, however, both the 
ECB and financial market actors will most likely look at the results of the Eurozone and 
the extent to which the reform has been a precursor to increased deficits.  If this were the 
case, larger deficits on the part of larger countries would affect the Eurozone more than 
its smaller counterparts.  In addition, as the leading figures in monetary integration, 
French and German actors set the tone for the rest of the area.  But the proceedings 
against France and Germany were not met with a strong reaction from financial markets, 
so it remains to be seen if they will respond to this latest political development or 
continue to keep a watchful eye on how the respective economies of the participating 
countries progress. 
Thus, the question of country size affects the reaction not only of fellow Member 
States but also other institutions and potentially financial actors. This is because the large 
states set an example for others as to what kind of behavior can be tolerated, and if the 
EU is unwilling to punish larger states, it may be difficult to punish smaller states for 
similar infractions.  The following section demonstrates that while the EU has treated 
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given the relatively stringent measures outlined in the SGP. 
 
Evidence: The Handling of Small States Versus Large States in the SGP 
Trouble began for the SGP shortly after the introduction of the euro in January 
2002.  On February 12, Ecofin ignored the Commission’s recommendation to warn 
Portugal and Germany about their budget deficits, which were approaching the 3 percent 
threshold.  This move was widely interpreted as political; German elections were 
scheduled for later that year, and it would have been awkward to chastise the government 
on an issue which it had previously championed so close to the election date.  Schroeder 
had begun an intensive lobbying campaign in 2001 to avoid such a warning, and 
ultimately Ecofin agreed.  Portugal was able to ride on Germany’s coattails in this 
instance, and both escaped censure temporarily.  It would have been awkward politically 
to punish one state and not the other for the same violation.     
The grace period did not last forever, though.  On November 5, 2002, Ecofin 
began proceedings against Portugal for running a deficit of 4.1 percent of GDP in 2001.  
This had political consequences, as two months later a general strike (its first in a decade) 
paralyzed Portugal as workers protested against the reforms undertaken by the 
government to bring its finance back into line with the demands of the Pact.  Despite 
these difficulties, Prime Minister Barroso vowed to do “whatever it takes” to comply with 
its provisions (Financial Times, 12/12/2002).  Portugal’s refusal to criticize the Pact 
differs sharply with French complaints that the Pact worsens economic conditions during 
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Times, 1/29/2003). 
Proceedings against Germany and France began the following year, with the 
German government facing a gap of 3.8 percent in 2002 and France with a gap of 3.1 
percent in 2003.  Though the Commission urged the finance ministers to accelerate 
proceedings against Germany and France, Ecofin settled for wresting promises from both 
governments in November 2003 that they would reduce their deficits by 2005, thus 
suspending the SGP.  The Commission responded by suing the finance ministers in 
January 2004 for ignoring the SGP’s excessive deficit rules.  In July of that year the 
Court voided the action of the Ecofin council, ruling that a new resolution must be 
reached with the Commission.  In December 2004, the Commission lifted the excessive 
deficits procedure off both Germany and France, citing new deficit projections from the 
respective governments for 2005.
5 
In April 2004 the Commission issued a formal warning to Italy over its budgetary 
situation, while Britain and the Netherlands received informal warnings.  At they July 
2004 Ecofin meeting, Interim Finance Minister Silvio Berlusconi convinced the other 
Members to reject the Commission’s proposal for an excessive deficit warning by 
submitting a 7.5 billion euro savings program.  The Netherlands was given until October 
2 to submit proposals to rectify this situation.  At the October 21, 2004 Ecofin meeting, 
the Council deemed that the Netherlands’ fiscal plan was making satisfactory progress 
towards correcting its deficit.
6 
                                                 
5 http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/edp/com_com_2004_en.pdf  
6 http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ecofin/82342.pdf  
  25  On September 23, 2004, Eurostat verified that Greece’s debt to deficit ratio 
would be changed from 1.7 percent to 4.6 percent.
7  Having learned of errors in the 
budgetary data that Greece provided prior to entering EMU, the Council requested 
additional data dating back to 1997.  Upon entering the Eurozone, Greece had 
misrepresented its deficit figures, and since then it has been unable to stay below SGP 
limits.  Greece was given until March 21, 2005 to demonstrate what measures it will take 
to alleviate its deficit (FT Deutschland, 2/17/2005).   
They were deemed insufficient.  “Los grandes no y los pequeños sí” read the 
opening line of a story in El Mundo (2/18/2005) regarding the decision to begin 
proceedings against Greece while suspending any actions that might be taken against 
France and Germany.  Ecofin had taken this decision on the recommendation of the 
Commission, which noted that the Greek government had not taken sufficient actions that 
would reduce its deficit below 3 percent in 2005.  However, Ecofin’s censure required 
Greece to get its deficit under control by 2006, a year later than that proposed by the 
Commission.  ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet criticized this decision, “The extension 
of the deadline, from 2005 to 2006, for correcting the excessive deficit pushes the room 
for interpretation of the rules and procedures to the limit” (AFX, 3/3/2005).  
The Commission has been holding large and small countries alike to the 
commitments made in the SGP, but standards have been applied differently by the 
Council of Ministers.  The most obvious cases of favoritism are the two largest countries, 
France and Germany, which faced no repercussions for its transgressions against the Pact 
                                                 
7 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/04/117&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en 
 
  26and were able to secure reforms to the Pact that will keep it out of trouble until after both 
countries hold major elections in 2006 (Germany) and 2007 (France).  Portugal was 
unable to avoid censure and worked to get its budget into line.  Italy and the Netherlands 
convinced other Member States that they would be able to rectify their fiscal situations 
quickly without facing formal warnings.  However Greece, like Portugal before it, must 
bring its deficits back into line to escape monetary damages in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
The handling of the Stability and Growth Pact resembles the debate over the rules 
of EMU under the Maastricht Treaty in that both seemed to be quite stringent in laying 
out quantitative rules and measures that would punish transgressors through exclusion 
(monetary union) or reputational damage and possibly monetary fines (SGP).  Instead, 
both proved to be remarkably flexible and open to politicization despite the rhetoric 
surrounding the importance of independence from political actors a decade ago.  The 
reasons for monetary integration were inherently political, and it should come as no 
surprise that its operations would be subject to political exigencies as well. 
France and Germany have had an easier time skirting punishment for their 
respective infractions against the SGP, even winning an agreement to reform the Pact in a 
way that makes it more amenable to their interests and more open to political 
interpretation.  Their motives for doing so rest with larger economic and political 
incentives that large states have to use fiscal policy with more discretion.  Economically, 
larger countries but especially Germany had sacrificed more when they gave up the 
ability to set their own monetary policy.  Politically, larger countries can better 
  27manipulate the rules due to institutional structures that give more voting weight to large 
states and norms that have made these two countries the leading voices for monetary 
integration for decades.  Though some of the smaller Member States and other 
institutional actors have decried this differential treatment, thus far their transgressions 
have not had discernibly negative effects. 
The flexibility of allowing states like Belgium and Italy before they met the 
convergence criteria did not do serious damage to the introduction of the euro.  Similarly, 
the ruckus caused by the relatively loose application of the SGP’s mechanisms for 
punishment are unlikely to be the cause of the euro’s demise or the downfall of EMU. 
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